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NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:Prerequisites for the NIEO

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International Relations-PSC 201
VU
LESSON 16
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER
How NIEO Could Be Achieved?
A NIEO would require revised terms of trade and removal of agricultural subsidies and technology transfer
from the developed to the developing world. Development aid, which is not `tied' or motivated by political
interests, could also help achieve economic development in poor countries.
Greater decision-making power in International Financial Institutions (World Bank, Asian Development
Bank and the International Monetary Fund) and the World Trade Organization could also help promote
more equitable development.
NIEO & the Islamic World
The Muslim world comprising of over a billion people and with impressive energy reserves like oil supplies,
still faces crippling levels of poverty and increasing disparities. It could thus have much to gain from the
NIEO.
The population, resources and institutions (SAARC, ECO and OIC) of the Muslim world could also make
it an effective advocate for the egalitarian approach espoused by NIEO.
NIEO Constraints and Challenges
NIEO does not pay sufficient attention to environmental concerns. This focus on the environment is vital
since growth that ignores environmental costs is not sustainable.
Achieving NIEO requires real shifts of power and privileges in the world order, which will have serious
political implications. It must be kept in mind however, that economic development does not necessarily
guarantee for human development.
What the Third World, or at least the driving element among the nonaligned, meant by a new international
order was very different. Revision of the international division of labor along the lines described was
intended to accompany and implement the establishment of a self-reliant industrial national economy.
The strengthening of the national state and the active role of state policy were, in this strategy, to ensure
that industry was not made up of discrete fragments, but of every stage of the production process. The
resort to importation of the ingredients of these production lines (the purchase of turnkey factories) entailed
a high level of exports, whether of 'traditional' raw materials or new industrial products. Hence the success
of the strategies was largely dependent on the capacity to win concessions, which was in turn the program
for the new international economic order.
The conflict of these two 'interpretations' of the new order has appeared in all the negotiations on the
industrial international division of labor and relocation. The points of discussion were the character and
options of establishment, the degree of decentralized decision-making, and the methods of financing the
transfers, issues of personnel training and management, and access to external markets. The Third World
states generally pressed for: the establishment of as complete industries as possible, with upstream and
downstream links, agreed rules subjecting the management of industrial units to the state's industrial policy,
an option for management of units by local staff, access to international distribution networks for
manufactured goods to localized firms (as the lowering of protectionist barriers by the developed countries
was not regarded as a sufficient guarantee of access to these markets), support for national technological
research, regulated financing (to avoid, for example, a subsidiary of a multinational financing its investment
by calling on local banking sources without bringing in new capital), regulation of transfers (a sharing of
risks, ceilings on exportable profits, obligations to invest part of the profit in the national economy) and so
on.
These demands were regarded as unacceptable by the multinationals whose sole interest was in partial
relocation through subsidiaries under their virtual control.
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International Relations-PSC 201
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Gradually, most of the Third World states have had to come to terms with the redeployment strategy. The
only states in a position to negotiate are those that refuse the direct establishment of subsidiaries and seek
an alternative in the purchase of turnkey factories within the framework of their overall industrialization
policy.
The strategy of these states counted on the possibility of successful change of the international order
through unilateral joint action, and through further action from North-South collective negotiations. The
idea, it should be remembered, was to organize cartels of Third World producers who could insist on price
revisions for raw materials. National control over natural resources should allow scope for negotiation not
only on supply, but also and above all on exploitation of the resources that took into account long-term
national interests and halted the rates of exploitation governed entirely by the needs of the developed world.
With this new-found strength, the Third World countries hoped to enjoy a genuine negotiating power that
would oblige the North to make concessions: for instance, access to its markets, a code of conduct for
transfers of technology. Co-operation between Third World countries ('collective self-reliance') was part of
this bid for strength.
This is the essential context for discussing the use of oil surpluses. On some views the NIEO was to be no
more than the rise in oil prices alone and the relocation of export industry a minor operation. On this view
the oil revenue surpluses should be made available to the developed financial markets to supply their own
policies of intervention in relations between developed countries, and marginal support for the 'survival' of
the old international division of labor in the developing countries. This rescued the attitude of 'aid' as a
permanent safety-valve ensuring the perpetuation of a system that was increasingly unjust day by day. The
actual use of oil surpluses has in fact served this purpose.
In the mid-1970s there was still the hope that the Third World would reject this narrow view. The non-
aligned movement and the group of 77 were seeking a strategy for collective battle for across the board
increases in raw materials prices, as the resolution on the solidarity fund and producers associations taken at
Dakar in February 1977 showed. This strong and valid approach was not sustained. Under the pressure of
the developed countries and the bias of UNCTAD and endless 'negotiation' and 'dialogue', the 'stabilization'
fund strategy replaced that of producers associations for collective unilateral intervention where such was
required.
Economic Possibilities for the Future
The divide between the rich and the poor will continue to increase given the current patterns of economic
growth seen around the world. The limits of growth will also catch up to spread more impoverishment
around the world.
There needs to a basic change of values and corresponding structural changes, which can ensure that
growth proves more beneficial for all, not those who are already rich.
Prerequisites for the NIEO
Political Development: need for good governance is imperative for economic growth, efficiency and
redistribution
Equitable Economic Development: growth without increasing internal disparities is much harder to achieve
Social Development: meet basic human needs and provide opportunity to all to realize latent potential
Environmental Sustainability: growth in a manner rate and at a pace which does not harm the natural
environment
Relevant Vocabulary
Latent: hidden, undeveloped or dormant
Disparities: differences
Egalitarian: equal, open, democratic
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International Relations-PSC 201
VU
Surplus: extra or in excess
Suggested Readings
Students are advised to read the following chapters to develop a better understanding of the various
principals highlighted in this hand-out:
Chapter 9 in `"A Study of International Relations" by Dr. Sultan Khan.
Internet Resources
In addition to reading from the textbook, please visit the following web-pages for this lecture, which
provide useful and interesting information:
The Struggle for the NIEO
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu32me/uu32me06.htm
Table of Contents:
  1. WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WHAT IS ITS RELEVANCE?
  2. APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEORIES IN IR
  3. APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:Traditional Approach
  4. THE NATION-STATE SYSTEM:Further Evolution of Nation-State
  5. THE NATION STATE SYSTEM: BASIC FEATURES OF A NATION-STATE
  6. NATIONAL INTEREST:Criteria for Defining National Interest
  7. NATIONAL INTEREST:Variations in National Interest, Relevant Vocabulary
  8. BALANCE OF POWER (BOP):BoP from a historical perspective
  9. BALANCE OF POWER (CONTINUED):Degree of Polarization, Functions of BoP
  10. DIPLOMACY:How Diplomacy Functions, Traditional Versus Modern Diplomacy
  11. DIPLOMACY (CONTINUED):Diplomatic Procedures & Practices, Functions of Diplomacy
  12. COLONIALISM, NEO-COLONIALISM & IMPERIALISM:Judging Colonization
  13. COLONIALISM, NEO-COLONIALISM & IMPERIALISM:Types of Neo-Colonialism
  14. COLONIALISM, NEO-COLONIALISM & IMPERIALISM:Objectives of Imperialism
  15. NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:Criticism of IEO, NIEO Activities
  16. NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:Prerequisites for the NIEO
  17. NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT:Origin of NAM, NAM’s Institutional Structure
  18. NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT (CONTINUED):Cairo Summit, Egypt - 1964
  19. NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT:Criticism of NAM, NAM and Pakistan
  20. THE COLD WAR AND ITS IMPACTS - INTRODUCING THE COLD WAR PHENOMENON
  21. THE COLD WAR AND ITS IMPACTS (CONTINUED):Truman Doctrine, Marshal Plan
  22. THE COLD WAR AND ITS IMPACTS (CONTINUED):End of the Cold War
  23. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL:History of Disarmament
  24. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL (CONTINUED):Other Disarmament Efforts
  25. THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
  26. THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (CONTINUED)
  27. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:Need for IGOs, Categorizing IGOs
  28. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (CONTINUED):United Nations, Criticism of the UN
  29. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (CONTINUED):European Union, World Bank
  30. THE ROLE OF DECISION MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
  31. DECISION MAKING (CONTINUED):Rational Actor Model, Group Politics Model
  32. SYSTEMS APPROACH TO IR:Underlying Assumptions, Elements of the System
  33. SYSTEMS BASED APPROACH (CONTINUED) – DISTINCT SYSTEMS IN IR
  34. LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY:Neoliberalism
  35. LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (CONTINUED):Liberalism vs. Social Democracy
  36. INTEGRATION IN IR:Preconditions for Integration, Assessing Integration
  37. GLOBALIZATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS:Advocates of Globalization
  38. THE GLOBAL DIVIDE:World Social Forum, Can the Global Divide Be Bridged?
  39. FOCUS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS:Pro-poor Foreign Investments
  40. CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:Components of a Conflict
  41. CONFLICT RESOLUTION:Creative response, Appropriate assertiveness
  42. THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:Global Concern for the Environment
  43. THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:Environmental Concerns and IR, Some Other Issues
  44. HOW IR DIFFER FROM DOMESTIC POLITICS?:Strategies for altering state behavior
  45. CHANGE AND IR:Continuity in IR, Causality and counterfactuals, IR in a nutshell